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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE REPORT

COUNTRY China-Korea

DATE:

SUBJECT Political Information: Proposed Activities of
WANG Il-so (王逸曙)

INFO. Unstated

DIST. 23 May 1947

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PAGES 3
SUPPLEMENT

ORIGIN

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1. WANG Il-so (real name, KIM Hong-il 金鴻逸; Chinese name WANG I-shu also known as WANG Ung 王雄) was born in 1900 at Yangsi (124-27,38-57), Yongchon Gun, Pyongan-pukto. He finished primary school in Yangsi and went to Manchuria in 1915 where he lived for three years, presumably with his uncle, a leader in the Korean Democratic Party, and where he was a member of that party, in 1917-18. The uncle was at this time acquainted with KIM Il-sung (金日成), then a member of the Korean Independence Party. Around 1918 WANG went to Shanghai and entered the Chinese Army, probably as a captain in the Woosung Garrison. He was in Shanghai during the abortive Korean 1919 revolution. Either shortly before he left Manchuria or shortly after, he married a Chinese who bore him two children. After she died, WANG married a Korean who bore him three sons, now 26, 21 and 13 years old, all of whom were born in Hongkong. About 1920 WANG entered the Yunnan Military Academy and was graduated three years later (with the rank of major?). In 1924 he went to Canton to take part in CHIANG Kai-shek's northward march to Nanking. About 1926 he was promoted to the rank of major general and given command of a division in Woosung. The next four years are unaccounted for. In 1930 he entered the Military University in Lushan (116-02,29-32)* and was graduated in 1933. His activities between 1934 and 1943 are not known in detail. In 1934 he was employed in Chungking (?) as an advisor by the Chinese Central Government Military Council and, during the war, he was in the Bureau of Military Administration in Hsian and Chungking, intermittently leading an army against the Japanese. In 1943 he drew up a plan for the training of ten divisions of the Chinese Youth Army (not the San Min Chu I Youth Corps youth army) by U.S. troops in Kweilin and Burma. At this time he was chief-of-staff of the Youth Army in southern China and Burma, and in the south China and Burma campaigns, he was a leading strategist. He was stationed at Myitkyina during part of this time. (Shanghai note: Although source states that the Youth Army was not connected with the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, it is felt here that the SMCIYC army is referred to. Part of this army, which was trained in south China, became the New First Army and New Sixth Army which fought in Burma and which later was sent to Kunning for paratroop training.) From May to August 1945, WANG was chief-of-staff of the Korean Restoration Army. Acting in this capacity, he was offered arms and ammunition by CHIANG Kai-shek if he would put the KRA in the proposed battle for Hangchow. WANG agreed, planning to concentrate the scattered forces of the KRA and train them for three months.

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*[?] Ruling 115-58, 29-33]

-2-

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General LEE Chong-chun, then commander of the KRA, and other leaders of the KPG insisted that such a move would be suicidal. This reluctance of the KPG leaders and transportation difficulties prevented the concentration, and WANG resigned his post in disgust, rejoining the Chinese Central Government Military Council. In the fall of 1945, he was appointed chief of the Korean Affairs Section of the NECC in Chinchou (121-06, 41-06). In March 1946 WANG moved his staff to Mukden. In his administration to the Koreans in Manchuria, he made efforts to counteract the impression made by the KPGRG*, which followed in April 1946 the disbandment of the KPG in China. He also attempted to realign the Korean Volunteer Corps with the Chinese National Army, which had originally sponsored its organization. During the summer of 1946, he received a cable from LU Dong-yol, who offered him a position as intelligence officer in the KNDC**. WANG accepted and came to Shanghai in October. An additional reason for his coming to Shanghai was to clear up a rumor, probably started by jealous members of the KPGRG, to the effect that he was a Communist. His early connection with the Korean Democratic Party in Manchuria, many members of which are now Communists, was cited, as well as his liaison with Korean Communist leaders fighting with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria.

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Note: The following report, WANG's personal account of himself, differs from the foregoing account.

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2. WANG was graduated from primary school on 30 March 1910, in which year he went to China to attend high school. He was graduated from high school on 25 March 1915 and went to Japan in 1915 to attend school (what kind of school is not stated). In 1920 he accompanied the first group of Koreans who went to Siberia for training under the Soviets (this group formed the nucleus of the Korean Volunteer Corps). He was a teacher in the KVC training school and finally became vice-commander of the Corps in Manchuria and Siberia. Perceiving that the Corps was gradually working more closely with Soviet and Chinese Communists, WANG, who is not a Communist, joined the Chinese National Army and became a member of the Kuomintang. He was successively a captain; a battalion commander; chief-of-staff of a division; chief-of-staff of the Chinese Educated Army (?) in Chekiang Province; chief of G-3 in Aweilin; and finally, chief of Korean Affairs Section of NECC, Mukden. He attended the Chinese Military College in Chungking for two years, being graduated on 25 December 1941 with the rank of major general. He returned to Shanghai in October 1946 to refute rumors charging he was a Communist and to await transportation to Korea to accept the position offered him by LU Dong-yol. He has resigned from the Chinese Army and the Kuomintang and now claims no connection with the KPGRG.
3. WANG has plans to avert civil war in Korea after the withdrawal of the occupying forces. He intends to set up intelligence nets in North Korea and Manchuria in an attempt to contact leaders of the Korean Volunteer Corps, sound them out and propose an alliance with South Korean forces, as well as to gather intelligence on the Korean Communists and try, by propaganda methods, to stir the anti-civil war sentiments of all Koreans in Manchuria and North Korea.
4. WANG bases his hopes for success on his knowledge of the KVC and its leaders. The KVC was formed in Manchuria to fight the Japanese and was recruited from Koreans in Manchuria, Siberia and Korea, some of whom had been trained in Siberia under the Soviets. This army was never strictly Communist, but only for Korean independence. At a time when the army was organized but without arms and supplies, the Chinese Communists gave it logistical support and thus gained its allegiance. Its members fear Soviet domination of North Korea. Korean troops in Manchuria did not actually fight the Chinese Nationalists until the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from Changchun in the spring of 1946 when the Soviets sent Russian-born Koreans to Chientao Province to join the KVC as high-ranking officers. These officers have ordered the Koreans to fight against the Nationalists.

* [Korean Provisional Government Representative Group]

** [Korean National Defense Corps]

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-3-

5. The KVC has long been known as KIM Il-sung's army. In reality, the leader has been KIM Il-om (金日成), the man who arranged with the Soviets to train Korean troops in Siberia. KIM Il-om studied in Moscow. In 1943 because he disagreed with the Soviet plan to send the Koreans from Siberia to Europe, KIM led 70,000 of the 130,000 Koreans in Siberia to Manchuria. There are now about 70-80,000 Koreans in the KVC (Shanghai Note: Other estimates place the strength at about 230,000). KIM Il-om, also known as MU Chong (characters unknown), has not, however, been with the KVC since April 1946, but with the Soviet-trained Korean Communist troops in Pyongyang. The present leader of the KVC is PAK Hyo-sam (朴孝三), ex-vice-commander.
6. WANG believes that his friendship with PAK Hyo-sam, the anti-Soviet, pro-Korean attitude of most of the KVC members, their high regard of him as their former instructor and the fact that the North Korean Communists would be virtually surrounded by hostile forces all add up to make success of his plan possible.

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